Participation in fraudulent elections

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F16%3A00459201" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/16:00459201 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0939-7" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0939-7</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0939-7" target="_blank" >10.1007/s00355-015-0939-7</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Participation in fraudulent elections

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

I analyze a costly voting model of elections in which the incumbent can stuff the ballot box to investigate how electoral fraud affects the decisions of voters to participate. I find that two stable equilibria may exist: an abstention equilibrium, where none of the voters vote and the incumbent always wins, and a more efficient coordination equilibrium, where a substantial share of a challenger’s supporters vote and the candidate preferred by the majority is likely to win. I further show that because the higher capability of the incumbent to stuff a ballot box discourages the participation of his own supporters and creates participation incentives for the challenger’s supporters, higher fraud does not always benefit the incumbent, even when costless. The model may help to explain two empirical observations related to fraudulent elections: a positive relationship between fraud and the margin of victory and a negative relationship between fraud and voter turnout.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Participation in fraudulent elections

Popis výsledku anglicky

I analyze a costly voting model of elections in which the incumbent can stuff the ballot box to investigate how electoral fraud affects the decisions of voters to participate. I find that two stable equilibria may exist: an abstention equilibrium, where none of the voters vote and the incumbent always wins, and a more efficient coordination equilibrium, where a substantial share of a challenger’s supporters vote and the candidate preferred by the majority is likely to win. I further show that because the higher capability of the incumbent to stuff a ballot box discourages the participation of his own supporters and creates participation incentives for the challenger’s supporters, higher fraud does not always benefit the incumbent, even when costless. The model may help to explain two empirical observations related to fraudulent elections: a positive relationship between fraud and the margin of victory and a negative relationship between fraud and voter turnout.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Social Choice and Welfare

ISSN

0176-1714

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

46

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

30

Strana od-do

863-892

Kód UT WoS článku

000373998300007

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84949521547