Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F22%3A00556776" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/22:00556776 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/25840886:_____/22:N0000030

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters privately have formed preferences over two candidates and act sequentially, I study how different rules for disclosing information about the actions of early voters affect the actions of later voters, and how they ultimately affect voters' and candidates' welfare. Comparing three rules observed in real-life elections (no information disclosure, turnout disclosure and vote count disclosure), I find that vote count disclosure dominates the other two rules in terms of both voter welfare and the ex-ante likelihood of electing the candidate preferred by the majority. I show further that each of the rules can provide a candidate with either a greater or lesser chance of winning, depending on the levels of ex-ante support for the candidates. The findings may be useful for designing optimal voting procedures, particularly in settings with small numbers of voters.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation

Popis výsledku anglicky

Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters privately have formed preferences over two candidates and act sequentially, I study how different rules for disclosing information about the actions of early voters affect the actions of later voters, and how they ultimately affect voters' and candidates' welfare. Comparing three rules observed in real-life elections (no information disclosure, turnout disclosure and vote count disclosure), I find that vote count disclosure dominates the other two rules in terms of both voter welfare and the ex-ante likelihood of electing the candidate preferred by the majority. I show further that each of the rules can provide a candidate with either a greater or lesser chance of winning, depending on the levels of ex-ante support for the candidates. The findings may be useful for designing optimal voting procedures, particularly in settings with small numbers of voters.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GJ19-18741Y" target="_blank" >GJ19-18741Y: Efektivnost volebních politik při nákladné volbě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Public Choice

ISSN

0048-5829

e-ISSN

1573-7101

Svazek periodika

190

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3-4

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

317-344

Kód UT WoS článku

000713913700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85118364774