Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F16%3A00461426" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/16:00461426 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/16:00472319

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Games and Economic Behavior

ISSN

0899-8256

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

98

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

July

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

8

Strana od-do

235-242

Kód UT WoS článku

000381955100014

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84978230436