Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F20%3A00540205" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/20:00540205 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/20:00525430

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo, the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment, players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute, when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo, the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment, players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute, when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Journal of Political Economy

ISSN

0176-2680

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

63

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

June

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

101816

Kód UT WoS článku

000538156800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85081245355