Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

How do voters allocate costly attention to alternative political issues? And how does selective ignorance of voters interact with policy design by politicians? We address these questions byndeveloping a model of electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters. Rational inattention amplifies the effects of preference intensity, because voters pay more attention where stakes are higher. The model has many potential applications, and those that we discuss in more detail imply that extremist voters are more attentive and inuential, public goods are underprovided, divisive issues receive more attention, and less transparent candidates choose more extreme policies. Endogenous attention can also lead to multiple equilibria, explaining how poor voters in developing countries can be politically empowered by welfare programs.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters

Popis výsledku anglicky

How do voters allocate costly attention to alternative political issues? And how does selective ignorance of voters interact with policy design by politicians? We address these questions byndeveloping a model of electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters. Rational inattention amplifies the effects of preference intensity, because voters pay more attention where stakes are higher. The model has many potential applications, and those that we discuss in more detail imply that extremist voters are more attentive and inuential, public goods are underprovided, divisive issues receive more attention, and less transparent candidates choose more extreme policies. Endogenous attention can also lead to multiple equilibria, explaining how poor voters in developing countries can be politically empowered by welfare programs.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů