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Ignorance isn't bliss: Uninformed voters drive budget cycles

Identifikátory výsledku

  • Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F19%3A10242072" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/19:10242072 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Výsledek na webu

    <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272719300039?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272719300039?via%3Dihub</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.003" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.003</a>

Alternativní jazyky

  • Jazyk výsledku

    angličtina

  • Název v původním jazyce

    Ignorance isn't bliss: Uninformed voters drive budget cycles

  • Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

    The paper shows that blissful ignorance does not apply to fiscal policy. In countries with uninformed voters, politicians attempt to &apos;buy&apos; votes by substantially increasing government expenditures in election years. This generates budget cycles and costly macroeconomic fluctuations. Unlike much of the earlier literature that found this effect only in low-income countries or new democracies, we demonstrate that it has occurred in many prosperous countries with an established political system. In particular, constructing a comprehensive Informed-voter (INFOVOT) index and quantifying it for the 1995-2014 period, we show that only the top third of OECD countries with well informed voters has not experienced political budget cycles. In contrast, the bottom third of OECD countries with poorly informed voters has consistently seen a deterioration of the budget balance by 0.7-1.2% of GDP in election years. This represents an increase of 18-30% relative to their usual (non-election) budget deficits. Interestingly, for the intermediate group of countries with moderately informed voters, for example Austria, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the U.K. and the U.S., election budget cycles occurred during the 1995-2008 period, but not since. We discuss why their election year deficit hikes (of 0.5-0.8% of GDP) may have disappeared after the Global financial crisis - drawing on the rational inattention literature. All our results are supported by a large number of robustness checks, including the use of a yearly version of the index (YINFOVOT). We conclude by offering some policy recommendations that may improve the voters&apos; incentives to process fiscal policy information. As such, they could help to escape an &apos;ignorance trap&apos; whereby uniformed voters choose politicians whose policies reinforce the voters&apos; ignorance.

  • Název v anglickém jazyce

    Ignorance isn't bliss: Uninformed voters drive budget cycles

  • Popis výsledku anglicky

    The paper shows that blissful ignorance does not apply to fiscal policy. In countries with uninformed voters, politicians attempt to &apos;buy&apos; votes by substantially increasing government expenditures in election years. This generates budget cycles and costly macroeconomic fluctuations. Unlike much of the earlier literature that found this effect only in low-income countries or new democracies, we demonstrate that it has occurred in many prosperous countries with an established political system. In particular, constructing a comprehensive Informed-voter (INFOVOT) index and quantifying it for the 1995-2014 period, we show that only the top third of OECD countries with well informed voters has not experienced political budget cycles. In contrast, the bottom third of OECD countries with poorly informed voters has consistently seen a deterioration of the budget balance by 0.7-1.2% of GDP in election years. This represents an increase of 18-30% relative to their usual (non-election) budget deficits. Interestingly, for the intermediate group of countries with moderately informed voters, for example Austria, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the U.K. and the U.S., election budget cycles occurred during the 1995-2008 period, but not since. We discuss why their election year deficit hikes (of 0.5-0.8% of GDP) may have disappeared after the Global financial crisis - drawing on the rational inattention literature. All our results are supported by a large number of robustness checks, including the use of a yearly version of the index (YINFOVOT). We conclude by offering some policy recommendations that may improve the voters&apos; incentives to process fiscal policy information. As such, they could help to escape an &apos;ignorance trap&apos; whereby uniformed voters choose politicians whose policies reinforce the voters&apos; ignorance.

Klasifikace

  • Druh

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

  • CEP obor

  • OECD FORD obor

    50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Návaznosti výsledku

  • Projekt

    <a href="/cs/project/GA16-22540S" target="_blank" >GA16-22540S: "Jak ty mně, tak já tobě?" Obnovení fiskální a finanční stability bez ohrožení měnové stability</a><br>

  • Návaznosti

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Ostatní

  • Rok uplatnění

    2019

  • Kód důvěrnosti údajů

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku

  • Název periodika

    Journal of Public Economics

  • ISSN

    0047-2727

  • e-ISSN

  • Svazek periodika

    173

  • Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

    May 2019

  • Stát vydavatele periodika

    CH - Švýcarská konfederace

  • Počet stran výsledku

    23

  • Strana od-do

    21-43

  • Kód UT WoS článku

    000467661900002

  • EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

    2-s2.0-85062852068