Production priorities in dynamic relationships

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F20%3A00532805" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/20:00532805 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2963" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2963</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE2963" target="_blank" >10.3982/TE2963</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Production priorities in dynamic relationships

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We characterise optimal contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model of joint production in which project opportunities are heterogenous, utility from these projects is non-transferable and the agent has the option to quit the relationship at any time. In order to demand the production of projects that benefit her but not the agent, the principal must commit to produce projects that benefit the agent in the future. Production at all stages of the relationship is ordered by projects' cost-effectiveness, which is their efficiency in transferring utility between the principal and the agent: cost-effective demands impose relatively low costs on the agent, and cost-effective compensation imposes relatively low costs on the principal. Over time, optimal contracts become more generous towards the agent by adding commitments to less cost-effective compensation. In turn, because this new compensation cannot be profitably exchanged against less cost-effective demands, the principal narrows the scope of her demands.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Production priorities in dynamic relationships

Popis výsledku anglicky

We characterise optimal contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model of joint production in which project opportunities are heterogenous, utility from these projects is non-transferable and the agent has the option to quit the relationship at any time. In order to demand the production of projects that benefit her but not the agent, the principal must commit to produce projects that benefit the agent in the future. Production at all stages of the relationship is ordered by projects' cost-effectiveness, which is their efficiency in transferring utility between the principal and the agent: cost-effective demands impose relatively low costs on the agent, and cost-effective compensation imposes relatively low costs on the principal. Over time, optimal contracts become more generous towards the agent by adding commitments to less cost-effective compensation. In turn, because this new compensation cannot be profitably exchanged against less cost-effective demands, the principal narrows the scope of her demands.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Theoretical Economics

ISSN

1933-6837

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

15

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

29

Strana od-do

861-889

Kód UT WoS článku

000549863900001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85087449734