Minorities’ strategic response to discrimination: experimental evidence

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F22%3A00556916" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/22:00556916 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/22:00556917

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104630" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104630</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104630" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104630</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Minorities’ strategic response to discrimination: experimental evidence

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Discrimination against minorities is pervasive in many societies, but little is known about strategies that minorities apply to minimize discrimination. In our trust game with 758 high-school students in the country of Georgia, ethnic Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to investigate Armenians’ willingness to hide their ethnicity to avoid expected discrimination. 43 percent of Armenian trustees untruthfully signal that they have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and identity-based motives. This strategic misrepresentation of ethnicity increases Georgian trustors’ expected back transfers and eliminates their discriminatory behavior.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Minorities’ strategic response to discrimination: experimental evidence

Popis výsledku anglicky

Discrimination against minorities is pervasive in many societies, but little is known about strategies that minorities apply to minimize discrimination. In our trust game with 758 high-school students in the country of Georgia, ethnic Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to investigate Armenians’ willingness to hide their ethnicity to avoid expected discrimination. 43 percent of Armenian trustees untruthfully signal that they have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and identity-based motives. This strategic misrepresentation of ethnicity increases Georgian trustors’ expected back transfers and eliminates their discriminatory behavior.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-11091S" target="_blank" >GA20-11091S: Determinanty prosociálního a antisociálního chování: poznatky z terénních ekonomických experimentů</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Public Economics

ISSN

0047-2727

e-ISSN

0047-2727

Svazek periodika

208

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

April

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

104630

Kód UT WoS článku

000821046800017

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85125563007