Quo vadis? Evidence on new firm-bank matching and firm performance following “sin” bank closures

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F23%3A00573331" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/23:00573331 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp754.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp754.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Quo vadis? Evidence on new firm-bank matching and firm performance following “sin” bank closures

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, we analyze how firms search for new lenders after a financial regulator forcibly closes their prior banks, and what happens to the firms’ performance during this transition period. In 2013, the Central Bank of Russia launched a large-scale bank closure policy and started detecting fraudulent (sin) banks and revoking their licenses. By 2020, two-thirds of all operating banks had been shuttered. We analyze this unique period in history using credit register data. First, we establish that before sin bank closures, there was no informational leakage and the borrowing firms remain unaffected. After the closures, there is a clear sorting pattern: poorly-performing firms rush to other (not-yet-detected) sin banks, while profitable firms transfer to financially solid banks. We find that the coupling of poorly-performing firms and not-yet-detected sin banks occurs more frequently when the two sin banks (the prior and the next lender) are commonly owned or when the local banking market is unconcentrated. Finally, we show that during the transition period (i.e., after the sin bank closures and before matching to new banks), poorly-performing firms shrink in size and experience a sharp decline in borrowings and market sales, whereas profitable firms strengthen in terms of employment, investment, and market sales. A potential mechanism involves credit risk underpricing by sin banks: we find that poorly-performing firms (especially commonly owned) received loans at lower interest rates than profitable firms prior to sin bank closures.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Quo vadis? Evidence on new firm-bank matching and firm performance following “sin” bank closures

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, we analyze how firms search for new lenders after a financial regulator forcibly closes their prior banks, and what happens to the firms’ performance during this transition period. In 2013, the Central Bank of Russia launched a large-scale bank closure policy and started detecting fraudulent (sin) banks and revoking their licenses. By 2020, two-thirds of all operating banks had been shuttered. We analyze this unique period in history using credit register data. First, we establish that before sin bank closures, there was no informational leakage and the borrowing firms remain unaffected. After the closures, there is a clear sorting pattern: poorly-performing firms rush to other (not-yet-detected) sin banks, while profitable firms transfer to financially solid banks. We find that the coupling of poorly-performing firms and not-yet-detected sin banks occurs more frequently when the two sin banks (the prior and the next lender) are commonly owned or when the local banking market is unconcentrated. Finally, we show that during the transition period (i.e., after the sin bank closures and before matching to new banks), poorly-performing firms shrink in size and experience a sharp decline in borrowings and market sales, whereas profitable firms strengthen in terms of employment, investment, and market sales. A potential mechanism involves credit risk underpricing by sin banks: we find that poorly-performing firms (especially commonly owned) received loans at lower interest rates than profitable firms prior to sin bank closures.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/LX22NPO5101" target="_blank" >LX22NPO5101: Národní institut pro výzkum socioekonomických dopadů nemocí a systémových rizik</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů