Social ties at work and effort choice: experimental evidence from Tanzania

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F24%3A00597989" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/24:00597989 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/24:00604597

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103354" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103354</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103354" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103354</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Social ties at work and effort choice: experimental evidence from Tanzania

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Many firms hire workers via social networks. Whether workers who are socially connected to their employers exert more effort on the job is an unsettled debate. We address this question through a novel experiment with small-business owners in Tanzania. Participants are paired with a worker who conducts a real-effort task, and receive a payoff that depends on the worker’s effort. Some business owners are randomly paired with workers they know, while others are paired with strangers. We find that being connected to one’s employer does not affect workers’ effort on average, but increases the effort of workers without children. Our results are consistent with workers having an altruistic drive in exerting effort when they work for someone they know, which fades away when their valuation of private income becomes stronger.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Social ties at work and effort choice: experimental evidence from Tanzania

Popis výsledku anglicky

Many firms hire workers via social networks. Whether workers who are socially connected to their employers exert more effort on the job is an unsettled debate. We address this question through a novel experiment with small-business owners in Tanzania. Participants are paired with a worker who conducts a real-effort task, and receive a payoff that depends on the worker’s effort. Some business owners are randomly paired with workers they know, while others are paired with strangers. We find that being connected to one’s employer does not affect workers’ effort on average, but increases the effort of workers without children. Our results are consistent with workers having an altruistic drive in exerting effort when they work for someone they know, which fades away when their valuation of private income becomes stronger.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Development Economics

ISSN

0304-3878

e-ISSN

1872-6089

Svazek periodika

171

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

October

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

103354

Kód UT WoS článku

001313278300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85202669762