Dynamic sparse restricted perceptions equilibria

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F24%3A00600964" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/24:00600964 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp792.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp792.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Dynamic sparse restricted perceptions equilibria

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper studies convergence properties, including local and global strong E-stability, of the rational expectations equilibrium under non-smooth learning dynamics. In a simple New Keynesian model, we consider two types of informational constraints operating jointly - adaptive learning and sparse rationality. For different initial beliefs, we study if the convergence to the minimum state variable rational expectations equilibrium (MSV REE) occurs over time for positive costs of attention. We find that for any initial beliefs the agents’ forecasting rule converges either to the MSV REE equilibrium, or, for large attention costs, to a rule that disregards all variables but the constant. Stricter monetary policy slightly favors the constant only rule. Mis-specified forecasting rule that uses variable not present in the MSV REE does not survive this learning algorithm. Theory of non-smooth differential equations is applied to study the dynamics of our learning algorithm.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Dynamic sparse restricted perceptions equilibria

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper studies convergence properties, including local and global strong E-stability, of the rational expectations equilibrium under non-smooth learning dynamics. In a simple New Keynesian model, we consider two types of informational constraints operating jointly - adaptive learning and sparse rationality. For different initial beliefs, we study if the convergence to the minimum state variable rational expectations equilibrium (MSV REE) occurs over time for positive costs of attention. We find that for any initial beliefs the agents’ forecasting rule converges either to the MSV REE equilibrium, or, for large attention costs, to a rule that disregards all variables but the constant. Stricter monetary policy slightly favors the constant only rule. Mis-specified forecasting rule that uses variable not present in the MSV REE does not survive this learning algorithm. Theory of non-smooth differential equations is applied to study the dynamics of our learning algorithm.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů