Revamping Associative Obligations

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68378122%3A_____%2F18%3A00503723" target="_blank" >RIV/68378122:_____/18:00503723 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Revamping Associative Obligations

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In Revamping Associative Obligations, Pavlakos asserts that Dworkin’s own view of associative obligations should be extended to bound- aries beyond the State and coercive institutions in general. Pavlakos criticizes the voluntaristic conception of State and International Law. Furthermore, Pavlakos asserts that practices, conventions, and facts cannot be the grounds of associative obligations. On the contrary, principles and norms are the grounds of associative obligations and coercion only acts as a trigger of these grounding principles and norms. This new conception gives space to a new conception of global justice and associative obligations, which are at the heart of International Law. Like Dworkin, Pavlakos defends the idea that associative obligations bind us in an inevitable manner for the only feature of being human beings. He tells us ‘a key congruence of non-voluntariness is that political obligation takes hold on citizens as a piecemeal approval of individual obligations, but instead as a general scheme of principle which ought to be presumed as forming a shared conception of legitimacy among the members of the political community’. Pavlakos argues that Dworkin’s limited conception of associative obligation to the State is due to his starting point, which is his concern for showing that the political and legal institutions ought to provide a justification for the coercion of the State. The puzzle is that this limited view of political obligation would entail that special relations towards others are reduced to the narrow interpretation of ‘proximity’, which requires affinity, kinship, or tribal allegiance. However, Pavlakos asserts that the model reverses the order of explanation between associative obligations and feelings of responsibility. According to this model, we first ‘come’ about others and then we incur the relevant obligations. The feeling of responsibility, Pavlakos tells us, is the result of being subject to normative reasons that ‘pull’ us towards associative obligations. He argues that the coercive imposition of obligations is only a trigger for binding associative obligation. Therefore, the scope of such associative obligations is determined by their grounding. Coercive facts, which are determined by the State, cannot explain the scope of political obligations.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Revamping Associative Obligations

Popis výsledku anglicky

In Revamping Associative Obligations, Pavlakos asserts that Dworkin’s own view of associative obligations should be extended to bound- aries beyond the State and coercive institutions in general. Pavlakos criticizes the voluntaristic conception of State and International Law. Furthermore, Pavlakos asserts that practices, conventions, and facts cannot be the grounds of associative obligations. On the contrary, principles and norms are the grounds of associative obligations and coercion only acts as a trigger of these grounding principles and norms. This new conception gives space to a new conception of global justice and associative obligations, which are at the heart of International Law. Like Dworkin, Pavlakos defends the idea that associative obligations bind us in an inevitable manner for the only feature of being human beings. He tells us ‘a key congruence of non-voluntariness is that political obligation takes hold on citizens as a piecemeal approval of individual obligations, but instead as a general scheme of principle which ought to be presumed as forming a shared conception of legitimacy among the members of the political community’. Pavlakos argues that Dworkin’s limited conception of associative obligation to the State is due to his starting point, which is his concern for showing that the political and legal institutions ought to provide a justification for the coercion of the State. The puzzle is that this limited view of political obligation would entail that special relations towards others are reduced to the narrow interpretation of ‘proximity’, which requires affinity, kinship, or tribal allegiance. However, Pavlakos asserts that the model reverses the order of explanation between associative obligations and feelings of responsibility. According to this model, we first ‘come’ about others and then we incur the relevant obligations. The feeling of responsibility, Pavlakos tells us, is the result of being subject to normative reasons that ‘pull’ us towards associative obligations. He argues that the coercive imposition of obligations is only a trigger for binding associative obligation. Therefore, the scope of such associative obligations is determined by their grounding. Coercive facts, which are determined by the State, cannot explain the scope of political obligations.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-23955S" target="_blank" >GA15-23955S: ROLE PRINCIPU PROPORCIONALITY V ROZHODOVÁNÍ ÚSTAVNÍCH SOUDŮ</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Dignity in the Legal and Political Philosophy of Ronald Dworkin

ISBN

978-0199484171

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

337-360

Počet stran knihy

512

Název nakladatele

Oxford University Press India

Místo vydání

New Delhi

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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