Non-naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68378122%3A_____%2F18%3A00503716" target="_blank" >RIV/68378122:_____/18:00503716 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Non-naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In Non-Naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen, George Pavlakos argues that Kelsen is committed to certain non-naturalist presuppositions that are incompatible with what pavlakos characterises as a strict separation between the legal and the moral domain. As he understands it, non-naturalism is synonymous with, or at least constitutes a condition of, practical normativity in general. Pavlakos argues that insofar as normativity pertains to the moral as well as the legal domain, one cannot consistently treat legal obligation in a non-naturalistic manner and concludes by attempting to sketch an alternative account of normativity that does not, as he believes Kelsens does, entail an artificial distinction between law and morality that condemn(s) law to interness.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Non-naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen

Popis výsledku anglicky

In Non-Naturalism, Normativity and the Meaning of Ought: Some Lessons from Kelsen, George Pavlakos argues that Kelsen is committed to certain non-naturalist presuppositions that are incompatible with what pavlakos characterises as a strict separation between the legal and the moral domain. As he understands it, non-naturalism is synonymous with, or at least constitutes a condition of, practical normativity in general. Pavlakos argues that insofar as normativity pertains to the moral as well as the legal domain, one cannot consistently treat legal obligation in a non-naturalistic manner and concludes by attempting to sketch an alternative account of normativity that does not, as he believes Kelsens does, entail an artificial distinction between law and morality that condemn(s) law to interness.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-23955S" target="_blank" >GA15-23955S: ROLE PRINCIPU PROPORCIONALITY V ROZHODOVÁNÍ ÚSTAVNÍCH SOUDŮ</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Unpacking Normativity. Conceptual, Normative, and Descriptive Issues

ISBN

978-1-50991-624-5

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

77-94

Počet stran knihy

272

Název nakladatele

Hart Publishing

Místo vydání

Oxford

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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