Practical Performance of Refinements of Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F14%3A00221854" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/14:00221854 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/36940" target="_blank" >http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/36940</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-201" target="_blank" >10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-201</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Practical Performance of Refinements of Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Nash equilibrium (NE) is the best known solution concept used in game theory. It is known that NE is particularly weak even in zero-sum extensive-form games since it can prescribe irrational actions to play that do not exploit mistakes made by an imperfect opponent. These issues are addressed by a number of refinements of NE that strengthen the requirements for equilibrium strategies. However, a thorough experimental analysis of practical performance of the Nash equilibria refinement strategies is, to the best of our knowledge, missing. This paper aims to fill this void and provides the first broader experimental comparison of the quality of refined Nash strategies in zero-sum extensive-form games. The experimental results suggest that (1) there is a significant difference between the best and the worst NE strategy against imperfect opponents, (2) the existing refinements outperform the worst NE strategy, (3) they typically perform close to the best possible NE strategy, and (4) the di

Název v anglickém jazyce

Practical Performance of Refinements of Nash Equilibria in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games

Popis výsledku anglicky

Nash equilibrium (NE) is the best known solution concept used in game theory. It is known that NE is particularly weak even in zero-sum extensive-form games since it can prescribe irrational actions to play that do not exploit mistakes made by an imperfect opponent. These issues are addressed by a number of refinements of NE that strengthen the requirements for equilibrium strategies. However, a thorough experimental analysis of practical performance of the Nash equilibria refinement strategies is, to the best of our knowledge, missing. This paper aims to fill this void and provides the first broader experimental comparison of the quality of refined Nash strategies in zero-sum extensive-form games. The experimental results suggest that (1) there is a significant difference between the best and the worst NE strategy against imperfect opponents, (2) the existing refinements outperform the worst NE strategy, (3) they typically perform close to the best possible NE strategy, and (4) the di

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

IN - Informatika

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP202%2F12%2F2054" target="_blank" >GAP202/12/2054: Bezpečnostní hry v extenzivní formě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

ISBN

978-1-61499-418-3

ISSN

0922-6389

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

201-206

Název nakladatele

IOS Press

Místo vydání

Amsterdam

Místo konání akce

Praha

Datum konání akce

18. 8. 2014

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000349444700035