Game-Theoretic Algorithms for Optimal Network Security Hardening Using Attack Graphs

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00234339" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00234339 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2773429" target="_blank" >http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2773429</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Game-Theoretic Algorithms for Optimal Network Security Hardening Using Attack Graphs

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In network security hardening a network administrator may need to use limited resources (such as honeypots) to harden a network against possible attacks. Attack graphs are a common formal model used to represent possible attacks. However, most existing works on attack graphs do not consider the reactions of attackers to different defender strategies. We introduce a game-theoretic model of the joint problem where attacker?s strategies are represented using attack graphs, and defender?s strategies are represented as modifications of the attack graph. The attack graphs we use allow for sequential attack actions with associated costs and probabilities of success/failure. We present an algorithm for an computing attack policy that maximizes attacker?s expected reward and empirical results demonstrating our methods on a case study network.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Game-Theoretic Algorithms for Optimal Network Security Hardening Using Attack Graphs

Popis výsledku anglicky

In network security hardening a network administrator may need to use limited resources (such as honeypots) to harden a network against possible attacks. Attack graphs are a common formal model used to represent possible attacks. However, most existing works on attack graphs do not consider the reactions of attackers to different defender strategies. We introduce a game-theoretic model of the joint problem where attacker?s strategies are represented using attack graphs, and defender?s strategies are represented as modifications of the attack graph. The attack graphs we use allow for sequential attack actions with associated costs and probabilities of success/failure. We present an algorithm for an computing attack policy that maximizes attacker?s expected reward and empirical results demonstrating our methods on a case study network.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

IN - Informatika

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

ISBN

978-1-4503-3771-7

ISSN

1548-8403

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

2

Strana od-do

1773-1774

Název nakladatele

IFAAMAS

Místo vydání

County of Richland

Místo konání akce

Istanbul

Datum konání akce

4. 5. 2015

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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