Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00234380" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00234380 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_13" target="_blank" >http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_13</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_13" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_13</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We study the problem of network security hardening, in which a network administrator decides what security measures to use to best improve the security of the network. Specifically, we focus on deploying decoy services or hosts called honeypots. We modelthe problem as a general-sum extensive-form game with imperfect information and seek a solution in the form of Stackelberg Equilibrium. The defender seeks the optimal randomized honeypot deployment in a specific computer network, while the attacker chooses the best response as a contingency attack policy from a library of possible attacks compactly represented by attack graphs. Computing an exact Stackelberg Equilibrium using standard mixed-integer linear programming has a limited scalability in this game. We propose a set of approximate solution methods and analyze the trade-off between the computation time and the quality of the strategies calculated.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information

Popis výsledku anglicky

We study the problem of network security hardening, in which a network administrator decides what security measures to use to best improve the security of the network. Specifically, we focus on deploying decoy services or hosts called honeypots. We modelthe problem as a general-sum extensive-form game with imperfect information and seek a solution in the form of Stackelberg Equilibrium. The defender seeks the optimal randomized honeypot deployment in a specific computer network, while the attacker chooses the best response as a contingency attack policy from a library of possible attacks compactly represented by attack graphs. Computing an exact Stackelberg Equilibrium using standard mixed-integer linear programming has a limited scalability in this game. We propose a set of approximate solution methods and analyze the trade-off between the computation time and the quality of the strategies calculated.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

IN - Informatika

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Decision and Game Theory for Security

ISBN

978-3-319-25593-4

ISSN

0302-9743

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

228-249

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

London

Místo konání akce

London

Datum konání akce

4. 11. 2015

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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