Game Theoretic Model of Strategic Honeypot Selection in Computer Networks

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F12%3A00197018" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/12:00197018 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.springer.com/computer/database+management+%26+information+retrieval/book/978-3-642-34265-3" target="_blank" >http://www.springer.com/computer/database+management+%26+information+retrieval/book/978-3-642-34265-3</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_12" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_12</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Game Theoretic Model of Strategic Honeypot Selection in Computer Networks

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A honeypot is a decoy computer system used in network security to waste the time and resources of attackers and to analyze their behaviors. While there has been significant research on how to design honeypot systems, less is known about how to use honeypots strategically in network defense. Based on formal deception games, we develop two game-theoretic models that provide insight into how valuable should honeypots look like to maximize the probability that a rational attacker will attack a honeypot. Thefirst model captures a static situation and the second allows attackers to imperfectly probe some of the systems on the network to determine which ones are likely to be real systems (and not honeypots) before launching an attack. We formally analyze theproperties of the optimal strategies in the games and provide linear programs for their computation. Finally, we present the optimal solutions for a set of instances of the games and evaluate their quality in comparison to several baseli

Název v anglickém jazyce

Game Theoretic Model of Strategic Honeypot Selection in Computer Networks

Popis výsledku anglicky

A honeypot is a decoy computer system used in network security to waste the time and resources of attackers and to analyze their behaviors. While there has been significant research on how to design honeypot systems, less is known about how to use honeypots strategically in network defense. Based on formal deception games, we develop two game-theoretic models that provide insight into how valuable should honeypots look like to maximize the probability that a rational attacker will attack a honeypot. Thefirst model captures a static situation and the second allows attackers to imperfectly probe some of the systems on the network to determine which ones are likely to be real systems (and not honeypots) before launching an attack. We formally analyze theproperties of the optimal strategies in the games and provide linear programs for their computation. Finally, we present the optimal solutions for a set of instances of the games and evaluate their quality in comparison to several baseli

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

IN - Informatika

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP202%2F12%2F2054" target="_blank" >GAP202/12/2054: Bezpečnostní hry v extenzivní formě</a><br>

Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Decision and Game Theory for Security

ISBN

978-3-642-34265-3

ISSN

0302-9743

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

201-220

Název nakladatele

Springer-Verlag, GmbH

Místo vydání

Heidelberg

Místo konání akce

Budapest

Datum konání akce

5. 11. 2012

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

—