Game-theoretic Foundations for the Strategic Use of Honeypots in Network Security

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00239665" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00239665 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-14039-1_5" target="_blank" >http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-14039-1_5</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14039-1_5" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-319-14039-1_5</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Game-theoretic Foundations for the Strategic Use of Honeypots in Network Security

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

An important element in the mathematical and scientific foundations for security is modeling the strategic use of deception and information manipulation. We argue that game theory provides an important theoretical framework for reasoning about information manipulation in adversarial settings, including deception and randomization strategies. In addition, game theory has practical uses in determining optimal strategies for randomized patrolling and resource allocation. We discuss three game-theoretic models that capture aspects of how honeypots can be used in network security. Honeypots are fake hosts introduced into a network to gather information about attackers and to distract them from real targets. They are a limited resource, so there are important strategic questions about how to deploy them to the greatest effect, which is fundamentally about deceiving attackers into choosing fake targets instead of real ones to attack. We describe several game models that address strategies for

Název v anglickém jazyce

Game-theoretic Foundations for the Strategic Use of Honeypots in Network Security

Popis výsledku anglicky

An important element in the mathematical and scientific foundations for security is modeling the strategic use of deception and information manipulation. We argue that game theory provides an important theoretical framework for reasoning about information manipulation in adversarial settings, including deception and randomization strategies. In addition, game theory has practical uses in determining optimal strategies for randomized patrolling and resource allocation. We discuss three game-theoretic models that capture aspects of how honeypots can be used in network security. Honeypots are fake hosts introduced into a network to gather information about attackers and to distract them from real targets. They are a limited resource, so there are important strategic questions about how to deploy them to the greatest effect, which is fundamentally about deceiving attackers into choosing fake targets instead of real ones to attack. We describe several game models that address strategies for

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

JC - Počítačový hardware a software

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP202%2F12%2F2054" target="_blank" >GAP202/12/2054: Bezpečnostní hry v extenzivní formě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Advances in Information Security

ISSN

1568-2633

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

56

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

56

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

81-101

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84927917238