Optimal Mixed Strategies for Cost-Adversarial Planning Games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F22%3A00359603" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/22:00359603 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/68407700:21730/22:00359603

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1609/icaps.v32i1.19797" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1609/icaps.v32i1.19797</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/icaps.v32i1.19797" target="_blank" >10.1609/icaps.v32i1.19797</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Optimal Mixed Strategies for Cost-Adversarial Planning Games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper shows that domain-independent tools from classical planning can be used to model and solve a broad class of game-theoretic problems we call Cost-Adversarial Planning Games (CAPGs). We define CAPGs as 2-player normal-form games specified by a planning task and a finite collection of cost functions. The first player (a planning agent) strives to solve a planning task optimally but has limited knowledge about its action costs. The second player (an adversary agent) controls the actual action costs. Even though CAPGs need not be zero-sum, every CAPG has an associated zero-sum game whose Nash equilibrium provides the optimal randomized strategy for the planning agent in the original CAPG. We show how to find the Nash equilibrium of the associated zero-sum game using a cost-optimal planner via the Double Oracle algorithm. To demonstrate the expressivity of CAPGs, we formalize a patrolling security game and several IPC domains as CAPGs.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Optimal Mixed Strategies for Cost-Adversarial Planning Games

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper shows that domain-independent tools from classical planning can be used to model and solve a broad class of game-theoretic problems we call Cost-Adversarial Planning Games (CAPGs). We define CAPGs as 2-player normal-form games specified by a planning task and a finite collection of cost functions. The first player (a planning agent) strives to solve a planning task optimally but has limited knowledge about its action costs. The second player (an adversary agent) controls the actual action costs. Even though CAPGs need not be zero-sum, every CAPG has an associated zero-sum game whose Nash equilibrium provides the optimal randomized strategy for the planning agent in the original CAPG. We show how to find the Nash equilibrium of the associated zero-sum game using a cost-optimal planner via the Double Oracle algorithm. To demonstrate the expressivity of CAPGs, we formalize a patrolling security game and several IPC domains as CAPGs.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000765" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000765: Výzkumné centrum informatiky</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling, ICAPS 2022

ISBN

978-1-57735-874-9

ISSN

2334-0835

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

160-168

Název nakladatele

AAAI Press

Místo vydání

Menlo Park

Místo konání akce

Singapur

Datum konání akce

19. 6. 2022

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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