A game approach to multi-dimensional opinion dynamics in social networks with stubborn strategist agents

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F24%3A00371756" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/24:00371756 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejcon.2023.100941" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejcon.2023.100941</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejcon.2023.100941" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejcon.2023.100941</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

A game approach to multi-dimensional opinion dynamics in social networks with stubborn strategist agents

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the multi-dimensional opinion formation of a social network whose population of agents interacts according to a communication graph. Each individual's opinion evolves according to an aggregation of disagreements between the agent's opinions and its graph neighbors on multiple interdependent topics exposed to an unknown extraneous disturbance. For a social network with strategist agents, the opinions evolve over time with respect to the minimization of a quadratic cost function that solely represents each individual's motives against the disturbance. We find the unique Nash/worst-case equilibrium solution for the proposed differential game model of coupled multi-dimensional opinions under an open-loop information structure. Moreover, we propose a distributed implementation of the Nash/worst-case equilibrium solution. We examine the non-distributed and proposed distributed open-loop Nash/worst-case strategies on a small social network with strategist agents in a two-dimensional opinion space. Then we compare the evolved opinions based on the Nash/worst-case strategy with the opinions corresponding to social optimality actions for non-strategist agents.

Název v anglickém jazyce

A game approach to multi-dimensional opinion dynamics in social networks with stubborn strategist agents

Popis výsledku anglicky

In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the multi-dimensional opinion formation of a social network whose population of agents interacts according to a communication graph. Each individual's opinion evolves according to an aggregation of disagreements between the agent's opinions and its graph neighbors on multiple interdependent topics exposed to an unknown extraneous disturbance. For a social network with strategist agents, the opinions evolve over time with respect to the minimization of a quadratic cost function that solely represents each individual's motives against the disturbance. We find the unique Nash/worst-case equilibrium solution for the proposed differential game model of coupled multi-dimensional opinions under an open-loop information structure. Moreover, we propose a distributed implementation of the Nash/worst-case equilibrium solution. We examine the non-distributed and proposed distributed open-loop Nash/worst-case strategies on a small social network with strategist agents in a two-dimensional opinion space. Then we compare the evolved opinions based on the Nash/worst-case strategy with the opinions corresponding to social optimality actions for non-strategist agents.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-07517S" target="_blank" >GA23-07517S: Agilní roje létajících robotů se spolehlivým multimodálním vnímáním a estimací svého stavu</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Journal of Control

ISSN

0947-3580

e-ISSN

1435-5671

Svazek periodika

75

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

January

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

001171895900001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85181844270