Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks With Self-Interested Individuals

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F24%3A00374541" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/24:00374541 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736" target="_blank" >10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks With Self-Interested Individuals

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium allows for self-enforcing strategic interactions between selfish and self-interested individuals. This article presents a differential game approach to the opinion formation problem in social networks to investigate the evolution of opinions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The opinion of each individual is described by a differential equation, which is the continuous-time Hegselmann-Krause model for opinion dynamics with a time delay in input. The objective of each individual is to seek optimal strategies for its own opinion evolution by minimizing an individual cost function. Two differential game problems emerge, one for a population that is not stubborn and another for a population that is stubborn. The open-loop Nash equilibrium actions and their associated opinion trajectories are derived for both differential games using Pontryagin's principle. Additionally, the receding horizon control scheme is used to practice feedback strategies where the information flow is restricted by fixed and complete social graphs, as well as the second neighborhood concept. The game strategies were executed on the well-known Zachary's Karate Club social network and a representative family opinion network. The resulting opinion trajectories associated with the game strategies showed consensus, polarization, and disagreement in final opinions.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks With Self-Interested Individuals

Popis výsledku anglicky

A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium allows for self-enforcing strategic interactions between selfish and self-interested individuals. This article presents a differential game approach to the opinion formation problem in social networks to investigate the evolution of opinions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The opinion of each individual is described by a differential equation, which is the continuous-time Hegselmann-Krause model for opinion dynamics with a time delay in input. The objective of each individual is to seek optimal strategies for its own opinion evolution by minimizing an individual cost function. Two differential game problems emerge, one for a population that is not stubborn and another for a population that is stubborn. The open-loop Nash equilibrium actions and their associated opinion trajectories are derived for both differential games using Pontryagin's principle. Additionally, the receding horizon control scheme is used to practice feedback strategies where the information flow is restricted by fixed and complete social graphs, as well as the second neighborhood concept. The game strategies were executed on the well-known Zachary's Karate Club social network and a representative family opinion network. The resulting opinion trajectories associated with the game strategies showed consensus, polarization, and disagreement in final opinions.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-07517S" target="_blank" >GA23-07517S: Agilní roje létajících robotů se spolehlivým multimodálním vnímáním a estimací svého stavu</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems

ISSN

2329-924X

e-ISSN

2329-924X

Svazek periodika

11

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

4426-4439

Kód UT WoS článku

001167335800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85183984571