Fine-grained view on bribery for group identification

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21240%2F23%3A00366259" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21240/23:00366259 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-023-09597-7" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-023-09597-7</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-023-09597-7" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10458-023-09597-7</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Fine-grained view on bribery for group identification

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications . The classical bribery problem in this context asks how many agents need to change their qualifications in order to change the outcome in a certain way. Complementing previous results showing polynomial-time solvability or NP-hardness of bribery for various social rules in the constructive (aiming at making specific agents socially qualified) or destructive (aiming at making specific agents socially disqualified) setting, we provide a comprehensive picture of the parameterized computational complexity landscape. Conceptually, we also consider a more fine-grained concept of bribery cost, where we ask how many single qualifications need to be changed, nonunit prices for different bribery actions, and a more general bribery goal that combines the constructive and destructive setting.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Fine-grained view on bribery for group identification

Popis výsledku anglicky

Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications . The classical bribery problem in this context asks how many agents need to change their qualifications in order to change the outcome in a certain way. Complementing previous results showing polynomial-time solvability or NP-hardness of bribery for various social rules in the constructive (aiming at making specific agents socially qualified) or destructive (aiming at making specific agents socially disqualified) setting, we provide a comprehensive picture of the parameterized computational complexity landscape. Conceptually, we also consider a more fine-grained concept of bribery cost, where we ask how many single qualifications need to be changed, nonunit prices for different bribery actions, and a more general bribery goal that combines the constructive and destructive setting.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000765" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000765: Výzkumné centrum informatiky</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

ISSN

1387-2532

e-ISSN

1573-7454

Svazek periodika

37

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

32

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

000959469500001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85150993552