Méditations Hégéliennes vs. Méditations Cartésiennes. Edmund Husserl and Wilfrid Sellars on the Given
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F19%3A10398306" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/19:10398306 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-17546-7_11#citeas" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-17546-7_11#citeas</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17546-7_11" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-17546-7_11</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Méditations Hégéliennes vs. Méditations Cartésiennes. Edmund Husserl and Wilfrid Sellars on the Given
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The goal of the present text is to analyze some aspects of Husserl's own phenomenology against the backdrop of the quite famous or infamous critique of the "Myth of the Given" proposed by the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Indeed, whereas Sellars' volume is usually deemed the ("textual" and "theoretical") source of what has been recently referred to as the "Hegelian Renaissance" characterizing analytic philosophy, Husserl and his transcendental phenomenology are on the contrary seen as the very expression of a new "form" of "Cartesianism." Now, after a quick discussion of Sellars' "diagnosis" of the Myth of the Given, the present essay elaborates on the general "Hegelian" character of his argumentations (as they are understood by Robert Brandom); finally, an analysis of Husserl's alleged Cartesianism in the late text known as Cartesian Meditations will be provided bearing upon the notions of "evidence" and "synthesis." As we firmly believe, our remarks will show not only that Husserl does not at all fall prey to the "Myth," but also that his understanding of the concept of reason can help us avoid some of the implications directly flowing from Sellars' position.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Méditations Hégéliennes vs. Méditations Cartésiennes. Edmund Husserl and Wilfrid Sellars on the Given
Popis výsledku anglicky
The goal of the present text is to analyze some aspects of Husserl's own phenomenology against the backdrop of the quite famous or infamous critique of the "Myth of the Given" proposed by the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Indeed, whereas Sellars' volume is usually deemed the ("textual" and "theoretical") source of what has been recently referred to as the "Hegelian Renaissance" characterizing analytic philosophy, Husserl and his transcendental phenomenology are on the contrary seen as the very expression of a new "form" of "Cartesianism." Now, after a quick discussion of Sellars' "diagnosis" of the Myth of the Given, the present essay elaborates on the general "Hegelian" character of his argumentations (as they are understood by Robert Brandom); finally, an analysis of Husserl's alleged Cartesianism in the late text known as Cartesian Meditations will be provided bearing upon the notions of "evidence" and "synthesis." As we firmly believe, our remarks will show not only that Husserl does not at all fall prey to the "Myth," but also that his understanding of the concept of reason can help us avoid some of the implications directly flowing from Sellars' position.
Klasifikace
Druh
C - Kapitola v odborné knize
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2019
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název knihy nebo sborníku
Hegel and Phenomenology
ISBN
978-3-030-17545-0
Počet stran výsledku
14
Strana od-do
177-190
Počet stran knihy
190
Název nakladatele
Springer
Místo vydání
London
Kód UT WoS kapitoly
—