Attribution arguments and the metaphysics of immanent actions: cognitive acts from Peter John Olivi to Durand of St. Pourçain

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F25%3A10494858" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/25:10494858 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=kgPEPI0zXb" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=kgPEPI0zXb</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2025.2455427" target="_blank" >10.1080/09608788.2025.2455427</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Attribution arguments and the metaphysics of immanent actions: cognitive acts from Peter John Olivi to Durand of St. Pourçain

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, I survey one of the key arguments used in Latin medieval psychology in favour of active views of cognition, from Peter John Olivi to Durand of St. Pourҁain. In broad terms, these &apos;attribution arguments&apos;, based on some appeal to other causal events or how we speak of them, argue that passive views of cognition have the absurd consequence that they misattribute our cognitive acts to things ultimately external to our intrinsic cognitive powers (viz., external objects or sensible/intelligible species). In the secondary literature, these arguments tend to get overshadowed by arguments with more distinctly Augustinian roots, based on the nobility of cognition or the experience of active attention. However, in this paper I argue that these &apos;attribution arguments&apos; are distinctly interesting, especially insofar as they speak to hot debates concerning so-called &apos;immanent acts&apos; and how to read Aristotle on such actions in Metaphysics Θ.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Attribution arguments and the metaphysics of immanent actions: cognitive acts from Peter John Olivi to Durand of St. Pourçain

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, I survey one of the key arguments used in Latin medieval psychology in favour of active views of cognition, from Peter John Olivi to Durand of St. Pourҁain. In broad terms, these &apos;attribution arguments&apos;, based on some appeal to other causal events or how we speak of them, argue that passive views of cognition have the absurd consequence that they misattribute our cognitive acts to things ultimately external to our intrinsic cognitive powers (viz., external objects or sensible/intelligible species). In the secondary literature, these arguments tend to get overshadowed by arguments with more distinctly Augustinian roots, based on the nobility of cognition or the experience of active attention. However, in this paper I argue that these &apos;attribution arguments&apos; are distinctly interesting, especially insofar as they speak to hot debates concerning so-called &apos;immanent acts&apos; and how to read Aristotle on such actions in Metaphysics Θ.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

ISSN

0960-8788

e-ISSN

1469-3526

Svazek periodika

33

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

25

Strana od-do

1045-1069

Kód UT WoS článku

001432944000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85218701772