Disagreement on a Bench: An Empirical Analysis of Dissent at the Czech Constitutional Court

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F24%3A10488909" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11220/24:10488909 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=i_Z6yqjB9k" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=i_Z6yqjB9k</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.62355/ejels.23797" target="_blank" >10.62355/ejels.23797</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Disagreement on a Bench: An Empirical Analysis of Dissent at the Czech Constitutional Court

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article examines the factors influencing dissenting opinions by judges at the Czech Constitutional Court (&quot;CCC&quot;). We build on the disagreement-identification model and the strategic accounts of dissenting behavior. Our findings do not support the existence of a strong norm of consensus operating at the CCC. However, the complexity of a case, measured by the number of CCC caselaw citations involved, is positively correlated with the probability of a dissenting opinion. Similarly, cases concerning controversial topics are more likely to generate dissents. A placebo test strengthens this finding by demonstrating that randomly chosen, non-controversial topics have minimal impact on dissenting behavior. The effect of voting blocs in the plenary proceedings seems to carry over to the 3-member chamber proceedings. The results also reveal that judges make strategic considerations. When facing a high workload, judges are less likely to write separate opinions, suggesting they prioritize workload management. Lastly, CCC judges do not seem to take into account collegiality costs.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Disagreement on a Bench: An Empirical Analysis of Dissent at the Czech Constitutional Court

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article examines the factors influencing dissenting opinions by judges at the Czech Constitutional Court (&quot;CCC&quot;). We build on the disagreement-identification model and the strategic accounts of dissenting behavior. Our findings do not support the existence of a strong norm of consensus operating at the CCC. However, the complexity of a case, measured by the number of CCC caselaw citations involved, is positively correlated with the probability of a dissenting opinion. Similarly, cases concerning controversial topics are more likely to generate dissents. A placebo test strengthens this finding by demonstrating that randomly chosen, non-controversial topics have minimal impact on dissenting behavior. The effect of voting blocs in the plenary proceedings seems to carry over to the 3-member chamber proceedings. The results also reveal that judges make strategic considerations. When facing a high workload, judges are less likely to write separate opinions, suggesting they prioritize workload management. Lastly, CCC judges do not seem to take into account collegiality costs.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European journal of empirical legal studies

ISSN

2004-8556

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

1

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

SE - Švédské království

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

231-254

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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