Dictatorship versus Manipulability Dilemma

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F12%3A10295838" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/12:10295838 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Dictatorship versus Manipulability Dilemma

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

By voting we mean the following pattern of collective choice: There is a set of alternatives and a group of individuals. Individual preferences over the alternatives are exogenously specified and are supposed to be orderings. The group is required to choose an alternative on the basis of stating and aggregating of individual preferences, or to produce a ranking of alternatives from the most preferred to the least preferred. In this paper concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation oftrue preferences) and dictatorship (voting procedure leads in all cases to social rankings that are identical with rankings of an individual) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability: there exists no voting procedure which satisfies at the same time non-dictatorship and non-manipulability.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Dictatorship versus Manipulability Dilemma

Popis výsledku anglicky

By voting we mean the following pattern of collective choice: There is a set of alternatives and a group of individuals. Individual preferences over the alternatives are exogenously specified and are supposed to be orderings. The group is required to choose an alternative on the basis of stating and aggregating of individual preferences, or to produce a ranking of alternatives from the most preferred to the least preferred. In this paper concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation oftrue preferences) and dictatorship (voting procedure leads in all cases to social rankings that are identical with rankings of an individual) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability: there exists no voting procedure which satisfies at the same time non-dictatorship and non-manipulability.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA402%2F08%2F0501" target="_blank" >GA402/08/0501: Politická ekonomie veřejných rozpočtů</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Quantitative Methods in Economics: multiple criteria decision making XVI : proceedings of the International scientific conference

ISBN

978-80-225-3426-0

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

5

Strana od-do

226-230

Název nakladatele

Ekonóm

Místo vydání

Bratislava

Místo konání akce

Bratislava

Datum konání akce

30. 5. 2012

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000307520000039