Voting experiments: measuring vulnerability of voting procedures to manipulation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F11%3A00368085" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/11:00368085 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/119" target="_blank" >http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/119</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Voting experiments: measuring vulnerability of voting procedures to manipulation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A minimal reduction in strategic voter's knowledge about other voters' voting patterns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem about strategic voter's complete information about all other voters' preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in thenumber of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting procedures are Condorcet-consistent procedures, followed by elimination procedures, while most prone to manipulation are the simplest rules. Strategic voting is vulnerable both to an absolute and relativereduction in amount of information.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Voting experiments: measuring vulnerability of voting procedures to manipulation

Popis výsledku anglicky

A minimal reduction in strategic voter's knowledge about other voters' voting patterns severely limits her ability to strategically manipulate the voting outcome. In this paper I relax the implicit assumption made in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem about strategic voter's complete information about all other voters' preference profiles. Via a series of computation-based simulations I find that vulnerability to strategic voting is decreasing in the number of voters and increasing in thenumber of alternatives. Least vulnerable voting procedures are Condorcet-consistent procedures, followed by elimination procedures, while most prone to manipulation are the simplest rules. Strategic voting is vulnerable both to an absolute and relativereduction in amount of information.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2011

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

AUCO Czech Economic Review

ISSN

1802-4696

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

5

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

324-345

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—