Centre-Province Relations in Personalist Autocracies : Explaining the Emergence and Survival of Powerful Provincial Leaders

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F22%3A10428665" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/22:10428665 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=g4iRjyqRFL" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=g4iRjyqRFL</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.13" target="_blank" >10.1017/gov.2021.13</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Centre-Province Relations in Personalist Autocracies : Explaining the Emergence and Survival of Powerful Provincial Leaders

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We have limited knowledge of how the insecure environment characteristic of personalist dictatorships affects the behaviour of provincial leaders. In this article, we argue that such provincial leaders face a trade-off: either they can keep a low profile but remain vulnerable to the capriciousness of the ruler (the acquiescent strategy), or they can gamble and try to build a power base of their own as a defence against the whims of the dictator (the power-accruing strategy). Next, we specify three contextual conditions, each of which makes provincial leaders more likely to choose and succeed with a power-accruing strategy, which in turn allows them to rule their province with an iron fist. Finally, empirically, we illustrate our arguments through a number of example cases and an in-depth study of a contemporary, very powerful provincial leader in a personalist authoritarian regime: Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic within Vladimir Putin&apos;s Russia.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Centre-Province Relations in Personalist Autocracies : Explaining the Emergence and Survival of Powerful Provincial Leaders

Popis výsledku anglicky

We have limited knowledge of how the insecure environment characteristic of personalist dictatorships affects the behaviour of provincial leaders. In this article, we argue that such provincial leaders face a trade-off: either they can keep a low profile but remain vulnerable to the capriciousness of the ruler (the acquiescent strategy), or they can gamble and try to build a power base of their own as a defence against the whims of the dictator (the power-accruing strategy). Next, we specify three contextual conditions, each of which makes provincial leaders more likely to choose and succeed with a power-accruing strategy, which in turn allows them to rule their province with an iron fist. Finally, empirically, we illustrate our arguments through a number of example cases and an in-depth study of a contemporary, very powerful provincial leader in a personalist authoritarian regime: Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic within Vladimir Putin&apos;s Russia.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Government and Opposition

ISSN

0017-257X

e-ISSN

1477-7053

Svazek periodika

57

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

446-466

Kód UT WoS článku

000767317700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85107898771