"Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too": Russian Public Support for the Use of Nuclear Weapons after the Invasion of Ukraine

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F25%3A10498622" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/25:10498622 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=c_40zsrNWr" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=c_40zsrNWr</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaf012" target="_blank" >10.1093/jogss/ogaf012</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

"Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too": Russian Public Support for the Use of Nuclear Weapons after the Invasion of Ukraine

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Following Russia&apos;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, experts have expressed concerns that Moscow&apos;s nuclear saber-rattling may have eroded the &quot;nuclear taboo&quot; and led to increased support for the use of nuclear weapons in Russian society. To investigate public attitudes toward nuclear use in Russia, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment on a representative sample of the Russian population. Our results show that despite significant shifts in the regional security environment, the Kremlin&apos;s belligerent rhetoric, and calls for nuclear strikes from politicians, experts, and journalists, public support for using nuclear weapons against NATO has remained virtually unchanged post-invasion. We suggest that this remarkable stability of the &quot;atomic aversion&quot; may stem from two countervailing factors: normalization of the idea of nuclear use in Russian society and deterrence through heightened concerns about NATO&apos;s retaliation. Our findings also demonstrate that Russian citizens disapprove of nuclear weapon use similarly in scenarios involving a conflict over Crimea with Ukraine and a Russia-NATO conflict in the Baltics. However, we observed a somewhat stronger public approval of a demonstrative nuclear explosion, a policy option recently proposed by Russian military experts. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on the strength of the nuclear nonuse norm in non-Western countries and to ongoing policy debates regarding domestic constraints on the Kremlin’s decision to use nuclear weapons to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Název v anglickém jazyce

"Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too": Russian Public Support for the Use of Nuclear Weapons after the Invasion of Ukraine

Popis výsledku anglicky

Following Russia&apos;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, experts have expressed concerns that Moscow&apos;s nuclear saber-rattling may have eroded the &quot;nuclear taboo&quot; and led to increased support for the use of nuclear weapons in Russian society. To investigate public attitudes toward nuclear use in Russia, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment on a representative sample of the Russian population. Our results show that despite significant shifts in the regional security environment, the Kremlin&apos;s belligerent rhetoric, and calls for nuclear strikes from politicians, experts, and journalists, public support for using nuclear weapons against NATO has remained virtually unchanged post-invasion. We suggest that this remarkable stability of the &quot;atomic aversion&quot; may stem from two countervailing factors: normalization of the idea of nuclear use in Russian society and deterrence through heightened concerns about NATO&apos;s retaliation. Our findings also demonstrate that Russian citizens disapprove of nuclear weapon use similarly in scenarios involving a conflict over Crimea with Ukraine and a Russia-NATO conflict in the Baltics. However, we observed a somewhat stronger public approval of a demonstrative nuclear explosion, a policy option recently proposed by Russian military experts. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on the strength of the nuclear nonuse norm in non-Western countries and to ongoing policy debates regarding domestic constraints on the Kremlin’s decision to use nuclear weapons to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

The Journal of Global Security Studies

ISSN

2057-3170

e-ISSN

2057-3189

Svazek periodika

10

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

1-20

Kód UT WoS článku

001484393900001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105002305507