Peirce's 1865 'Proofs'of Symbolization

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F17%3A10366993" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/17:10366993 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cpsem20166" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cpsem20166</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cpsem20166" target="_blank" >10.5840/cpsem20166</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Peirce's 1865 'Proofs'of Symbolization

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper is concerned with examination of Peirce&apos;s so-called proofs of symbolization, i.e. an argument by which he aims to show the grounds of possibility of the three species of inference, deduction, hypothesis, and induction. After clarifying the exact subject of the argument (1), I turn to the discussion of its two premisses, i.e. that the three species of inference are distinct and each must supply its own ground of proof (2), and that there is one kind of object corresponding to each inference (3). After that I turn to the exposition of Peirce&apos;s proofs of the principles for deduction, induction, and hypothesis (4). I conclude (5) that by this argument Peirce is able to explain generic unity and specific differences of inference founded upon the concept of symbolization and by interpreting Peirce&apos;s argument as transcendental, since its aim is to give explanatory account of the conditions making experience possible.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Peirce's 1865 'Proofs'of Symbolization

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper is concerned with examination of Peirce&apos;s so-called proofs of symbolization, i.e. an argument by which he aims to show the grounds of possibility of the three species of inference, deduction, hypothesis, and induction. After clarifying the exact subject of the argument (1), I turn to the discussion of its two premisses, i.e. that the three species of inference are distinct and each must supply its own ground of proof (2), and that there is one kind of object corresponding to each inference (3). After that I turn to the exposition of Peirce&apos;s proofs of the principles for deduction, induction, and hypothesis (4). I conclude (5) that by this argument Peirce is able to explain generic unity and specific differences of inference founded upon the concept of symbolization and by interpreting Peirce&apos;s argument as transcendental, since its aim is to give explanatory account of the conditions making experience possible.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Semiotics 2016: Archaeology of Concepts

ISBN

978-1-63435-035-8

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

neuvedeno

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

23-36

Název nakladatele

Philosophy Documentation Center

Místo vydání

Charlottesville, Virginia

Místo konání akce

Delray Beach

Datum konání akce

28. 9. 2016

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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