Clientelism and development: vote-buying meets patronage

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F22%3A00556762" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/22:00556762 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061515" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061515</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061515" target="_blank" >10.1177/09516298211061515</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Clientelism and development: vote-buying meets patronage

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Clientelism and development: vote-buying meets patronage

Popis výsledku anglicky

Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Theoretical Politics

ISSN

0951-6298

e-ISSN

1460-3667

Svazek periodika

34

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

32

Strana od-do

3-34

Kód UT WoS článku

000736355700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85121834091