Approval vs. participation quorums

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F25%3A00638653" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/25:00638653 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/25840886:_____/25:N0000023

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102747" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102747</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102747" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102747</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Approval vs. participation quorums

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Using a pivotal costly voting model, we analyze how participation and approval quorum requirements, applied separately or jointly, affect turnout, election outcomes, and welfare. To characterize an optimal quorum rule, we first show that equally strict participation and approval quorums often yield similar outcomes, unless the two settings result in equilibria that differ in terms of whether voters can coordinate on participation. Second, any combination of quorum types can be replaced by either an approval or participation quorum alone, with negligible or no impact on equilibrium. Using these results, we suggest that to maximize turnout, no quorum is optimal unless low status quo support is expected, in which case a strict approval quorum is preferred. To increase the status quo’s chances of winning, a strict approval quorum or no quorum works best. From a voter welfare perspective, an approval quorum near half the electorate or no quorum at all are reasonable choices. These results hold whether we use Bayesian Nash equilibrium or quantal response equilibrium as the solution concept.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Approval vs. participation quorums

Popis výsledku anglicky

Using a pivotal costly voting model, we analyze how participation and approval quorum requirements, applied separately or jointly, affect turnout, election outcomes, and welfare. To characterize an optimal quorum rule, we first show that equally strict participation and approval quorums often yield similar outcomes, unless the two settings result in equilibria that differ in terms of whether voters can coordinate on participation. Second, any combination of quorum types can be replaced by either an approval or participation quorum alone, with negligible or no impact on equilibrium. Using these results, we suggest that to maximize turnout, no quorum is optimal unless low status quo support is expected, in which case a strict approval quorum is preferred. To increase the status quo’s chances of winning, a strict approval quorum or no quorum works best. From a voter welfare perspective, an approval quorum near half the electorate or no quorum at all are reasonable choices. These results hold whether we use Bayesian Nash equilibrium or quantal response equilibrium as the solution concept.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GJ19-18741Y" target="_blank" >GJ19-18741Y: Efektivnost volebních politik při nákladné volbě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Journal of Political Economy

ISSN

0176-2680

e-ISSN

1873-5703

Svazek periodika

89

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

September

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

102747

Kód UT WoS článku

001562475300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105014195380