Hegel and Wittgenstein on Difficulties of Beginning at the Beginning

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F22%3A00129239" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/22:00129239 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-022-09797-y" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-022-09797-y</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09797-y" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11245-022-09797-y</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Hegel and Wittgenstein on Difficulties of Beginning at the Beginning

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Both Hegel and the later Wittgenstein were concerned with the problem of how to begin speculation, or the problem of beginning. I argue that despite many differences, there are surprising similarities between their thinking about the beginning. They both consider different kinds of beginnings and combine them into complex analogies. The beginning has a subjective and an objective moment. The philosophizing subject has to begin with something, with an object. For Hegel, the objective moment is pure being. For Wittgenstein, the objective moment is something that cannot be doubted. As regards the subjective moment, the philosophizing subject has to decide, without any reason, to conclude her quest for the presuppositionless beginning and finally begin at the beginning. The arational moment of this decision is echoed throughout any rational thought. Any application of a (rational) rule is, ultimately, a blind decision to apply this rule.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Hegel and Wittgenstein on Difficulties of Beginning at the Beginning

Popis výsledku anglicky

Both Hegel and the later Wittgenstein were concerned with the problem of how to begin speculation, or the problem of beginning. I argue that despite many differences, there are surprising similarities between their thinking about the beginning. They both consider different kinds of beginnings and combine them into complex analogies. The beginning has a subjective and an objective moment. The philosophizing subject has to begin with something, with an object. For Hegel, the objective moment is pure being. For Wittgenstein, the objective moment is something that cannot be doubted. As regards the subjective moment, the philosophizing subject has to decide, without any reason, to conclude her quest for the presuppositionless beginning and finally begin at the beginning. The arational moment of this decision is echoed throughout any rational thought. Any application of a (rational) rule is, ultimately, a blind decision to apply this rule.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA19-16680S" target="_blank" >GA19-16680S: Paradigmatické myšlení: singularita, universalita, sebe-reference</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Topoi

ISSN

0167-7411

e-ISSN

1572-8749

Svazek periodika

41

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

939-953

Kód UT WoS článku

000795606200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85130117989