Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F23%3A00136399" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/23:00136399 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0002" target="_blank" >10.2478/disp-2023-0002</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, I examine Brandom’s notion of a de re reading of a tradition and question its legitimacy under certain circumstances. Specifically, I argue that within the language game of giving and asking for reasons, commitments should be ascribed to the utterer within reasonable limits, with the utterer only responsible for intentional or negligent breaches of duty. Even if we were to include an ideal speaker who knows all facts available at the time of her utterance, she cannot be held accountable for ignorance of things that do not yet exist. Therefore, I further argue that the time of the utterance must be taken into consideration when ascribing commitments and keeping score in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This temporal aspect is suppressed by Brandom’s notion of de re reading for pragmatic reasons, as he seeks to tell an inferentialist story of the philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, I argue that legitimacy poses a problem even for this approach because Brandom formulates his account in terms of rules, responsibility and sanctions. I offer a critical perspective on Brandom’s de re reading and the broader implications of his inferentialist framework.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Limits of Commitments : The Legitimacy of Brandom’s De Re Reading

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, I examine Brandom’s notion of a de re reading of a tradition and question its legitimacy under certain circumstances. Specifically, I argue that within the language game of giving and asking for reasons, commitments should be ascribed to the utterer within reasonable limits, with the utterer only responsible for intentional or negligent breaches of duty. Even if we were to include an ideal speaker who knows all facts available at the time of her utterance, she cannot be held accountable for ignorance of things that do not yet exist. Therefore, I further argue that the time of the utterance must be taken into consideration when ascribing commitments and keeping score in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This temporal aspect is suppressed by Brandom’s notion of de re reading for pragmatic reasons, as he seeks to tell an inferentialist story of the philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, I argue that legitimacy poses a problem even for this approach because Brandom formulates his account in terms of rules, responsibility and sanctions. I offer a critical perspective on Brandom’s de re reading and the broader implications of his inferentialist framework.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Disputatio

ISSN

0873-626X

e-ISSN

2182-2875

Svazek periodika

15

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

68

Stát vydavatele periodika

PT - Portugalská republika

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

39-54

Kód UT WoS článku

001263242800003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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