Wherein is reasoning social?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F21%3A50017634" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/21:50017634 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_7</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Wherein is reasoning social?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

One of the main tenets of inferentialism is that reasoning is primarily a competence to play the social game of giving and asking for reasons. A rather similar idea has recently been elaborated from the naturalistic perspective by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. They argue that reasoning evolved originally and primarily for the purposes of social justification and argumentation. In this chapter I compare the inferentialist account of reasoning with the approach of Mercier and Sperber. I argue that although Mercier-Sperber’s naturalistic hypothesis is promising, their account of how reasoning works faces a number of philosophical objections that inferentialism has the resources to overcome. At the same time, I show that “naturalized” inferentialists could find congenial much of what Mercier and Sperber have to say about the social origins and functions of reasoning. Finally, I consider a different naturalistic account of the social nature of reasoning due to Michael Tomasello, who submits that reasoning evolved primarily for cooperative argumentation and joint or collective decision-making. I argue that Tomasello’s account may go too far in the collectivist tradition and I conclude that a more plausible naturalistic account of the sociality of human reasoning would likely recognize a mix of different social contexts and functions of reasoning.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Wherein is reasoning social?

Popis výsledku anglicky

One of the main tenets of inferentialism is that reasoning is primarily a competence to play the social game of giving and asking for reasons. A rather similar idea has recently been elaborated from the naturalistic perspective by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. They argue that reasoning evolved originally and primarily for the purposes of social justification and argumentation. In this chapter I compare the inferentialist account of reasoning with the approach of Mercier and Sperber. I argue that although Mercier-Sperber’s naturalistic hypothesis is promising, their account of how reasoning works faces a number of philosophical objections that inferentialism has the resources to overcome. At the same time, I show that “naturalized” inferentialists could find congenial much of what Mercier and Sperber have to say about the social origins and functions of reasoning. Finally, I consider a different naturalistic account of the social nature of reasoning due to Michael Tomasello, who submits that reasoning evolved primarily for cooperative argumentation and joint or collective decision-making. I argue that Tomasello’s account may go too far in the collectivist tradition and I conclude that a more plausible naturalistic account of the sociality of human reasoning would likely recognize a mix of different social contexts and functions of reasoning.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GF17-33808L" target="_blank" >GF17-33808L: Inferencializmus a kolektivní intencionalita</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Groups, Norms and Practices. Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality

ISBN

978-3-030-49589-3

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

119-146

Počet stran knihy

242

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Cham, Switzerland

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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