The evolution of reason giving and the confirmation bias: What has been explained?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F22%3A50019356" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/22:50019356 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48681554" target="_blank" >https://www.jstor.org/stable/48681554</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202250110" target="_blank" >10.5840/philtopics202250110</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The evolution of reason giving and the confirmation bias: What has been explained?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In their own way, inferentialists and interactionists both trace the roots of reflective reasoning to practices and skills for making, assessing, and responding to public performances in communicative practices of giving and asking for reasons. Inferentialists have developed the idea mostly on conceptual grounds. Interactionists ask, in a more empirical spirit, why and how such practices and skills might have evolved. Thus they promise complementary “anthropological” insights of foremost interest to inferentialists. But interactionist theories advance a number of controversial claims that deserve careful scrutiny. In this essay I focus on one such claim: namely that confirmation bias can be plausibly explained as a design feature that promotes postulated functions of interactive reasoning. And I argue that each of three extant proposals fails to make the claim good.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The evolution of reason giving and the confirmation bias: What has been explained?

Popis výsledku anglicky

In their own way, inferentialists and interactionists both trace the roots of reflective reasoning to practices and skills for making, assessing, and responding to public performances in communicative practices of giving and asking for reasons. Inferentialists have developed the idea mostly on conceptual grounds. Interactionists ask, in a more empirical spirit, why and how such practices and skills might have evolved. Thus they promise complementary “anthropological” insights of foremost interest to inferentialists. But interactionist theories advance a number of controversial claims that deserve careful scrutiny. In this essay I focus on one such claim: namely that confirmation bias can be plausibly explained as a design feature that promotes postulated functions of interactive reasoning. And I argue that each of three extant proposals fails to make the claim good.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Philosophical topics

ISSN

0276-2080

e-ISSN

2154-154X

Svazek periodika

50

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

213-234

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85156093442