Backsliding into Judicial Oligarchy? The Cautionary Tale of Georgia’s Failed Judicial Reforms, Informal Judicial Networks and Limited Access to Leadership Positions
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F22%3A00128946" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/22:00128946 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://katalog.muni.cz/Record/MUB01000500434" target="_blank" >https://katalog.muni.cz/Record/MUB01000500434</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15730352-BJA10067" target="_blank" >10.1163/15730352-BJA10067</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Backsliding into Judicial Oligarchy? The Cautionary Tale of Georgia’s Failed Judicial Reforms, Informal Judicial Networks and Limited Access to Leadership Positions
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
This article investigates the formal and informal factors behind the persistence of judicial oligarchies in post-communist countries despite large-scale reforms. This case study on Georgia reveals that formal positions of power in these judiciaries can be monopolized by a close-knit group, with a handful of influential judges (i.e. judicial oligarchs) at the top of its hierarchical structure. Drawing on in-depth interviews with sitting as well as former judges and other stakeholders of reform processes, the article attributes the failure to dismantle the rule of judicial oligarchs at least partly to legislative flaws and loopholes. More importantly, it warns about the reliance of judicial oligarchs on informal rules and practices to undermine formal rules and procedures meant to facilitate the meaningful participation of all judges in governing the judiciary. It uncovers informal mechanisms allowing the network of powerful judges to suppress the emergence of competing judicial networks and cement itself into leadership positions. Finally, the article reflects on the implications of these findings for designing and implementing judicial reforms in Georgia and beyond
Název v anglickém jazyce
Backsliding into Judicial Oligarchy? The Cautionary Tale of Georgia’s Failed Judicial Reforms, Informal Judicial Networks and Limited Access to Leadership Positions
Popis výsledku anglicky
This article investigates the formal and informal factors behind the persistence of judicial oligarchies in post-communist countries despite large-scale reforms. This case study on Georgia reveals that formal positions of power in these judiciaries can be monopolized by a close-knit group, with a handful of influential judges (i.e. judicial oligarchs) at the top of its hierarchical structure. Drawing on in-depth interviews with sitting as well as former judges and other stakeholders of reform processes, the article attributes the failure to dismantle the rule of judicial oligarchs at least partly to legislative flaws and loopholes. More importantly, it warns about the reliance of judicial oligarchs on informal rules and practices to undermine formal rules and procedures meant to facilitate the meaningful participation of all judges in governing the judiciary. It uncovers informal mechanisms allowing the network of powerful judges to suppress the emergence of competing judicial networks and cement itself into leadership positions. Finally, the article reflects on the implications of these findings for designing and implementing judicial reforms in Georgia and beyond
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50501 - Law
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
R - Projekt Ramcoveho programu EK
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2022
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Review of Central and East European Law
ISSN
0925-9880
e-ISSN
1573-0352
Svazek periodika
47
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
2
Stát vydavatele periodika
NL - Nizozemsko
Počet stran výsledku
35
Strana od-do
167-201
Kód UT WoS článku
000822043200001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85145208538