A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F23%3A00133122" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/23:00133122 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216224:14220/23:00133124

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/" target="_blank" >https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges, making a focus on legal characteristics insufficient to detect their actual functioning. Through an in-depth case study of Hungary’s judiciary after 2010, we show that ‘constitutional tinkering’ and informal clientelistic networks, used to control the executive and legislative branches, were also applied to the judiciary. Still, they remain underdeveloped because of the domestic and external restraints of judicial independence. Since reliable hard data is not available, we build our paper on interviews with Hungarian judges conducted in 2022. Based on these, we test the validity of existing theories and leverage thick descriptions to explain the means of control over judges.

Název v anglickém jazyce

A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

Popis výsledku anglicky

Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges, making a focus on legal characteristics insufficient to detect their actual functioning. Through an in-depth case study of Hungary’s judiciary after 2010, we show that ‘constitutional tinkering’ and informal clientelistic networks, used to control the executive and legislative branches, were also applied to the judiciary. Still, they remain underdeveloped because of the domestic and external restraints of judicial independence. Since reliable hard data is not available, we build our paper on interviews with Hungarian judges conducted in 2022. Based on these, we test the validity of existing theories and leverage thick descriptions to explain the means of control over judges.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

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Návaznosti

R - Projekt Ramcoveho programu EK

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů