The Perfectionist Critique of Public Reason Liberalism : The Arguments of Liberal Perfectionists

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F23%3A00132080" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/23:00132080 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://filcasop.flu.cas.cz/images/PDF_NA_WEB/FC_2023_03/489-505-fc3_23-TOMASTIK-BAROS.pdf" target="_blank" >https://filcasop.flu.cas.cz/images/PDF_NA_WEB/FC_2023_03/489-505-fc3_23-TOMASTIK-BAROS.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.46854/fc.2023.3r.489" target="_blank" >10.46854/fc.2023.3r.489</a>

Jazyk výsledku

slovinština

Název v původním jazyce

Perfekcionistická kritika liberalizmu verejného rozumu : Argumenty liberálnych perfekcionistov

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The aim of this article is to show from the position of liberal perfectionists that the arguments of public reason liberalism about the unacceptability of perfectionist efforts and controversial positions are unconvincing. In the first part, we will examine the moral respect objection to perfectionism as was formulated by Martha Nussbaum and show that such arguments fail, after which we will introduce a more appropriate, perfectionist conception. In the second part, we will address a more practical question which illustrates well the greater plausibility of the perfectionist position. We will critique an attempt to apply the respect-based argument to perfectionist subsidies, which the leading theorist of liberalism of public reason, Jonathan Quong, has rejected as manipulative. In the third part, we move from these everyday questions of political decision-making to how liberals of public reason use respect in controversial, cultural-ethical issues. Relying on neutral political values is shown to be an unsustainable and illusory solution in the pursuit of equal respect for all. These three lines of argumentation (i.e. theoretical, practical-political and cultural-ethical) will allow us to point out that the project of public reason liberalism brings with it far more problems than its proponents will acknowledge.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Perfectionist Critique of Public Reason Liberalism : The Arguments of Liberal Perfectionists

Popis výsledku anglicky

The aim of this article is to show from the position of liberal perfectionists that the arguments of public reason liberalism about the unacceptability of perfectionist efforts and controversial positions are unconvincing. In the first part, we will examine the moral respect objection to perfectionism as was formulated by Martha Nussbaum and show that such arguments fail, after which we will introduce a more appropriate, perfectionist conception. In the second part, we will address a more practical question which illustrates well the greater plausibility of the perfectionist position. We will critique an attempt to apply the respect-based argument to perfectionist subsidies, which the leading theorist of liberalism of public reason, Jonathan Quong, has rejected as manipulative. In the third part, we move from these everyday questions of political decision-making to how liberals of public reason use respect in controversial, cultural-ethical issues. Relying on neutral political values is shown to be an unsustainable and illusory solution in the pursuit of equal respect for all. These three lines of argumentation (i.e. theoretical, practical-political and cultural-ethical) will allow us to point out that the project of public reason liberalism brings with it far more problems than its proponents will acknowledge.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50600 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-06790S" target="_blank" >GA23-06790S: Lidská práva a welfarismus</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Filosofický časopis

ISSN

0015-1831

e-ISSN

2570-9232

Svazek periodika

71

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

489-505

Kód UT WoS článku

001105112500006

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85172443459