Comparing Competition and Regulated Monopoly in a Railway Market: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Comparing Competition and Regulated Monopoly in a Railway Market: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper introduces an agent-based model of a passenger railway line. The model is used for comparing the welfare of the railway market under unregulated duopoly and monopoly with maximum-price regulation. In the model, the railway operators graduallyadjust passenger fares and eliminate train departures until the market reaches steady state. The paper analyses the steady-state data generated using two sets of parameter values. It finds that for most maximum-price levels, including the price that would be chosen by an unregulated monopoly, the total welfare in the monopolistic market is significantly lower compared to the duopoly market. However, there are some levels of maximum price which produce similar or even higher welfare than the duopoly market. The paper suggests that if correctly implemented, a simple maximum-price regulation may generate welfare outcomes comparable to competition.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Comparing Competition and Regulated Monopoly in a Railway Market: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper introduces an agent-based model of a passenger railway line. The model is used for comparing the welfare of the railway market under unregulated duopoly and monopoly with maximum-price regulation. In the model, the railway operators graduallyadjust passenger fares and eliminate train departures until the market reaches steady state. The paper analyses the steady-state data generated using two sets of parameter values. It finds that for most maximum-price levels, including the price that would be chosen by an unregulated monopoly, the total welfare in the monopolistic market is significantly lower compared to the duopoly market. However, there are some levels of maximum price which produce similar or even higher welfare than the duopoly market. The paper suggests that if correctly implemented, a simple maximum-price regulation may generate welfare outcomes comparable to competition.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research

ISBN

9788021066113

ISSN

2336-1239

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

255-260

Název nakladatele

Masaryk University

Místo vydání

Brno

Místo konání akce

Šlapanice

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2014

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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