Motivation to corruption ? economical experiment

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F15%3A00084382" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/15:00084382 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Motivation to corruption ? economical experiment

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Corruption has been present in the society for ages and it keeps influencing many aspects of the people?s life. Recently, there have been a growing number of economical experiments exploring the corrupt behavior of subjects in different roles, cultures and under various conditions. This paper is inspired by already conducted experiments by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2004) and Cameron et al. (2009) but brings a new design of the corrupt situation. We conducted an experiment to examine the question whether the officials awarded with higher wages are less likely to accept a bribe or not. In two treatments, the motivators of government, officials and citizens in the corrupt situations are examined. In the exogenous treatment (ExT), government sets an individual wage for the official choosing from 5 levels and is paid the average wage plus the remaining budget as a bonus. Official is then informed about his wage and is offered a bribe, value of which does not change.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Motivation to corruption ? economical experiment

Popis výsledku anglicky

Corruption has been present in the society for ages and it keeps influencing many aspects of the people?s life. Recently, there have been a growing number of economical experiments exploring the corrupt behavior of subjects in different roles, cultures and under various conditions. This paper is inspired by already conducted experiments by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2004) and Cameron et al. (2009) but brings a new design of the corrupt situation. We conducted an experiment to examine the question whether the officials awarded with higher wages are less likely to accept a bribe or not. In two treatments, the motivators of government, officials and citizens in the corrupt situations are examined. In the exogenous treatment (ExT), government sets an individual wage for the official choosing from 5 levels and is paid the average wage plus the remaining budget as a bonus. Official is then informed about his wage and is offered a bribe, value of which does not change.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů