Bidding on Price and Quality: An Experiment on the Complexity of Scoring Rule Auctions

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F25%3A00140165" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/25:00140165 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01288/114759/Bidding-on-Price-and-Quality-An-Experiment-on-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext" target="_blank" >https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01288/114759/Bidding-on-Price-and-Quality-An-Experiment-on-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01288" target="_blank" >10.1162/rest_a_01288</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Bidding on Price and Quality: An Experiment on the Complexity of Scoring Rule Auctions

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We experimentally study procurement auctions when both quality and price matter. We compare two treatments where sellers compete on one dimension only (price or quality), with three treatments where sellers submit a price-quality bid and the winner is determined by a scoring rule that combines the two offers. We find that, in the scoring rule treatments, efficiency and buyer's utility are lower than predicted. Estimates from a Quantal Response Equilibrium model suggest that increasing the dimension of the strategy space imposes a complexity burden on sellers, so that a simpler mechanism like a quality-only auction may be preferable.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Bidding on Price and Quality: An Experiment on the Complexity of Scoring Rule Auctions

Popis výsledku anglicky

We experimentally study procurement auctions when both quality and price matter. We compare two treatments where sellers compete on one dimension only (price or quality), with three treatments where sellers submit a price-quality bid and the winner is determined by a scoring rule that combines the two offers. We find that, in the scoring rule treatments, efficiency and buyer's utility are lower than predicted. Estimates from a Quantal Response Equilibrium model suggest that increasing the dimension of the strategy space imposes a complexity burden on sellers, so that a simpler mechanism like a quality-only auction may be preferable.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

ISSN

0034-6535

e-ISSN

1530-9142

Svazek periodika

107

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

755-770

Kód UT WoS článku

001494264900019

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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