Základy teorie pozičního investování

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F25%3A%230001206" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/25:#0001206 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.37355/03.2025/1" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.37355/03.2025/1</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.37355/03.2025/1" target="_blank" >10.37355/03.2025/1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

čeština

Název v původním jazyce

Základy teorie pozičního investování

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The problem is not the distribution of property, i.e. the fact that some are richer and some are poorer. The problems arise where the property advantage of one can turn into an instrument of discrimination against another. If a given the issue through the prism of the exploitation of investment opportunities, we get not only a very good model of how this discrimination occurs (i.e. but also a very illustrative concept of how the efficiency of the economic system is lost. And - as yet we will recall - we also have a methodologically significant starting point for dealing with of the problems involved. The tools of analysis of positional investing (i.e. the phenomenon of the transformation of a property advantage into a privilege) are based on the financial market model supply and demand of investment funds and investment opportunities (lender demands investment opportunities and offers investment funds, the borrower demands investment funds and offers investment opportunities). The importance of this model becomes more apparent when it is presented in dual form (marginal and total variables), in particular if we compare it with the dual model of exchange of goods (the correlated Edgeworth diagram model and the graphical representation of the Nash bargaining problem). Based on this, we have developed analysis tools of positional investing, in particular the positional investing neutrality function and the composite payout function (which allow us to generalize some of the assumptions of payout distribution models from joint action and at the same time show that two different approaches to analyzing the phenomenon of positional investing lead to the same conclusions or have the same mathematical structure). The issue of different views of the neutrality function of positional investing raises the question of rational and irrational elements in the players' decisions, and consequently the question of when and how they project perceptions of future developments into current decision-making. A number of specific examples from the current theoretical literature dealing with the issue of the distribution of the benefits of joint action, which more or less explicitly mention or refer to the assumption of neutrality of positional investing interpretation of the conclusions. The outlined approach has a number of applications, e.g. in distinguishing between reforms that increase the efficiency of the system and contribute to more fully exploit investment opportunities according to the extent to which they from pseudo-reforms that reflect the negative effects of positioning on the efficiency of the economic system. In turn, the following can be used to the theoretical tools of positional investment analysis to identify potential conflict hotspots or, conversely, to show ways of resolving conflicts that have already erupted. Compared to earlier monographs, in which we have some issues of positional investing are also mentioned, we are moving the issue of positional to the design and implementation of mechanisms to increase efficiency and stability of economic systems. This area of game theory brings very powerful theoretical tools, without the use and refinement of which it is the practical applicability of theoretical reflection on social reality is very limited. The monograph culminates in the proposal of mechanisms for the effective functioning of society under conditions of dynamic technological development. From this point of view, it notes in particular the role of universities, their graduate networks and creative complementary teams as “end elements” of these networks. It addresses the issue of the distribution of benefits generated by synergistic effects of the networking defined as follows: university - alumni network - creative complementary teams. The proposed mechanisms are subjected to a critical perspective of mechanism theory.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Fundamentals of positional investing theory

Popis výsledku anglicky

The problem is not the distribution of property, i.e. the fact that some are richer and some are poorer. The problems arise where the property advantage of one can turn into an instrument of discrimination against another. If a given the issue through the prism of the exploitation of investment opportunities, we get not only a very good model of how this discrimination occurs (i.e. but also a very illustrative concept of how the efficiency of the economic system is lost. And - as yet we will recall - we also have a methodologically significant starting point for dealing with of the problems involved. The tools of analysis of positional investing (i.e. the phenomenon of the transformation of a property advantage into a privilege) are based on the financial market model supply and demand of investment funds and investment opportunities (lender demands investment opportunities and offers investment funds, the borrower demands investment funds and offers investment opportunities). The importance of this model becomes more apparent when it is presented in dual form (marginal and total variables), in particular if we compare it with the dual model of exchange of goods (the correlated Edgeworth diagram model and the graphical representation of the Nash bargaining problem). Based on this, we have developed analysis tools of positional investing, in particular the positional investing neutrality function and the composite payout function (which allow us to generalize some of the assumptions of payout distribution models from joint action and at the same time show that two different approaches to analyzing the phenomenon of positional investing lead to the same conclusions or have the same mathematical structure). The issue of different views of the neutrality function of positional investing raises the question of rational and irrational elements in the players' decisions, and consequently the question of when and how they project perceptions of future developments into current decision-making. A number of specific examples from the current theoretical literature dealing with the issue of the distribution of the benefits of joint action, which more or less explicitly mention or refer to the assumption of neutrality of positional investing interpretation of the conclusions. The outlined approach has a number of applications, e.g. in distinguishing between reforms that increase the efficiency of the system and contribute to more fully exploit investment opportunities according to the extent to which they from pseudo-reforms that reflect the negative effects of positioning on the efficiency of the economic system. In turn, the following can be used to the theoretical tools of positional investment analysis to identify potential conflict hotspots or, conversely, to show ways of resolving conflicts that have already erupted. Compared to earlier monographs, in which we have some issues of positional investing are also mentioned, we are moving the issue of positional to the design and implementation of mechanisms to increase efficiency and stability of economic systems. This area of game theory brings very powerful theoretical tools, without the use and refinement of which it is the practical applicability of theoretical reflection on social reality is very limited. The monograph culminates in the proposal of mechanisms for the effective functioning of society under conditions of dynamic technological development. From this point of view, it notes in particular the role of universities, their graduate networks and creative complementary teams as “end elements” of these networks. It addresses the issue of the distribution of benefits generated by synergistic effects of the networking defined as follows: university - alumni network - creative complementary teams. The proposed mechanisms are subjected to a critical perspective of mechanism theory.

Druh

B - Odborná kniha

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

ISBN

9788074082818

Počet stran knihy

112

Název nakladatele

Vysoká škola finanční a správní

Místo vydání

Praha

Kód UT WoS knihy

—