POSITIONAL INVESTING AND THE MECHANISMS OF A DYNAMIC SOCIETY

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F25%3A%230001204" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/25:#0001204 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2" target="_blank" >10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

POSITIONAL INVESTING AND THE MECHANISMS OF A DYNAMIC SOCIETY

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The comprehensive reforms needed to enhance innovation potential, change the nature of economic growth, and fully exploit the potential of artificial intelligence require designing and enforcing mechanisms in the sense of Hurwicz, Myerson, and Trockel. Their concepts are based on game theory, including Nash's bargaining problem. We interpret the above problem using a financial market model conceived as supply and demand of investment funds and investment opportunities, identify the phenomenon of positional investing and refine the theoretical tools of its analysis. We show the contribution but also the limitations of the role of positional investment theory to address the issue of the explicitness of the proposed mechanisms and the limitations of the role of external authority in their institutional provision.

Název v anglickém jazyce

POSITIONAL INVESTING AND THE MECHANISMS OF A DYNAMIC SOCIETY

Popis výsledku anglicky

The comprehensive reforms needed to enhance innovation potential, change the nature of economic growth, and fully exploit the potential of artificial intelligence require designing and enforcing mechanisms in the sense of Hurwicz, Myerson, and Trockel. Their concepts are based on game theory, including Nash's bargaining problem. We interpret the above problem using a financial market model conceived as supply and demand of investment funds and investment opportunities, identify the phenomenon of positional investing and refine the theoretical tools of its analysis. We show the contribution but also the limitations of the role of positional investment theory to address the issue of the explicitness of the proposed mechanisms and the limitations of the role of external authority in their institutional provision.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

CIFRA. Economics

ISSN

3034-1612

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

2025

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

RU - Ruská federace

Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

1-9

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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