Strategic voting in the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate elections: Testing Duverger?s Law in the second-order elections

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13410%2F16%3A43887777" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13410/16:43887777 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Strategic voting in the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate elections: Testing Duverger?s Law in the second-order elections

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article tests Duverger's law through analysis of the Polish Senate elections in 2011 and 2015. These two elections were held under the new first-past-the-post (or single-member plurality) system, which replaced formerly used unlimited vote. The main aim of the article is to test, whether we can confirm the expectations of strategic voting in the context of the so-called second-order elections, as the Polish Parliament is a classical example of the asymmetrical bicameralism, with the secondary role of the upper chamber, the Senate. The results show that the strategic voting was not universal phenomenon under the plurality rule, as indicated by many violations of Duverger's law. Our research confirmed that the effect of electoral institutions (institutional structure) is contingent and (at the district level) inhibited by country-specific conditions, with potentially strong influence of the second-order character of the Polish Senate elections.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Strategic voting in the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate elections: Testing Duverger?s Law in the second-order elections

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article tests Duverger's law through analysis of the Polish Senate elections in 2011 and 2015. These two elections were held under the new first-past-the-post (or single-member plurality) system, which replaced formerly used unlimited vote. The main aim of the article is to test, whether we can confirm the expectations of strategic voting in the context of the so-called second-order elections, as the Polish Parliament is a classical example of the asymmetrical bicameralism, with the secondary role of the upper chamber, the Senate. The results show that the strategic voting was not universal phenomenon under the plurality rule, as indicated by many violations of Duverger's law. Our research confirmed that the effect of electoral institutions (institutional structure) is contingent and (at the district level) inhibited by country-specific conditions, with potentially strong influence of the second-order character of the Polish Senate elections.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AD - Politologie a politické vědy

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Slovak Journal of Political Sciences

ISSN

1335-9096

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

16

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

23

Strana od-do

369-391

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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