Strategic Voting in Hungarian Elections of 2014: Evidence for Duverger's Law under the Compensatory Mixed Electoral System?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13410%2F18%3A43893702" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13410/18:43893702 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Strategic Voting in Hungarian Elections of 2014: Evidence for Duverger's Law under the Compensatory Mixed Electoral System?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article tests Duverger&apos;s law through an analysis of the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2014 which were held under the new compensatory mixed electoral system. The results show that while a strategic voting had a tendency to grow under Hungarian supermixed system in the period 1990-2010, in the elections of 2014 strategic voting was not a universal phenomenon under the plurality rule, as indicated by many violations of Duverger&apos;s law in Hungarian singlemember districts. Our research confirmed that the effect of electoral institutions (institutional structure) is contingent and at the district level inhibited by country-specific conditions. However, as a new Hungarian compensatory mixed electoral system distributes seats not only by plurality rule in SMDs (nominal tier), but also via proportional representation (list tier), a further research should pay attention to crosscontamination of both tiers of electoral system, as a potential factor which moves Hungarian electoral competition substantially away from Duvergerian predictions.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Strategic Voting in Hungarian Elections of 2014: Evidence for Duverger's Law under the Compensatory Mixed Electoral System?

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article tests Duverger&apos;s law through an analysis of the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2014 which were held under the new compensatory mixed electoral system. The results show that while a strategic voting had a tendency to grow under Hungarian supermixed system in the period 1990-2010, in the elections of 2014 strategic voting was not a universal phenomenon under the plurality rule, as indicated by many violations of Duverger&apos;s law in Hungarian singlemember districts. Our research confirmed that the effect of electoral institutions (institutional structure) is contingent and at the district level inhibited by country-specific conditions. However, as a new Hungarian compensatory mixed electoral system distributes seats not only by plurality rule in SMDs (nominal tier), but also via proportional representation (list tier), a further research should pay attention to crosscontamination of both tiers of electoral system, as a potential factor which moves Hungarian electoral competition substantially away from Duvergerian predictions.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review

ISSN

1582-4551

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

18

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

RO - Rumunsko

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

9-34

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85049256366