The use of a game theory model to explore the emergence of core/periphery structure in networks and its symmetry

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12510%2F21%3A43902768" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12510/21:43902768 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/13/7/1214" target="_blank" >https://www.mdpi.com/2073-8994/13/7/1214</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym13071214" target="_blank" >10.3390/sym13071214</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The use of a game theory model to explore the emergence of core/periphery structure in networks and its symmetry

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In network systems characterized by complex interactions of various types, core-periphery structures can be found. In this paper, we deal with such questions as what processes can lead to the emergence of core-periphery formation, whether this structure is symmetric, and to what extent. Namely, the question of symmetry in a complex network is still the subject of intense research interest. Symmetry can relate to network topology, network relationships, and other processes on networks. To answer these questions, we modified the model of the classic social dilemma called the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (or repeated PD game) by adding the cost of maintaining relationships between the pairs of players (partners) and especially by adding the possibility of ending some relationships. We present the results of simulations that suggest that the players’ network strategy (i.e., partner selection or termination of relationships with some partners) is the driving force behind the emergence of a core-periphery structure in networks rather than the player’s strategy in PD. Our results also suggest that the formed core is symmetric, and this symmetry is a result of the symmetric interactions of core players. Our outcomes can help understand various economic or social questions related to creating centers or peripheries, including their symmetry in different network systems. © 2021 by the authors.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The use of a game theory model to explore the emergence of core/periphery structure in networks and its symmetry

Popis výsledku anglicky

In network systems characterized by complex interactions of various types, core-periphery structures can be found. In this paper, we deal with such questions as what processes can lead to the emergence of core-periphery formation, whether this structure is symmetric, and to what extent. Namely, the question of symmetry in a complex network is still the subject of intense research interest. Symmetry can relate to network topology, network relationships, and other processes on networks. To answer these questions, we modified the model of the classic social dilemma called the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (or repeated PD game) by adding the cost of maintaining relationships between the pairs of players (partners) and especially by adding the possibility of ending some relationships. We present the results of simulations that suggest that the players’ network strategy (i.e., partner selection or termination of relationships with some partners) is the driving force behind the emergence of a core-periphery structure in networks rather than the player’s strategy in PD. Our results also suggest that the formed core is symmetric, and this symmetry is a result of the symmetric interactions of core players. Our outcomes can help understand various economic or social questions related to creating centers or peripheries, including their symmetry in different network systems. © 2021 by the authors.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Symmetry-Basel

ISSN

2073-8994

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

13

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

7

Stát vydavatele periodika

CH - Švýcarská konfederace

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

1-15

Kód UT WoS článku

000678230200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85109812287