EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO FORMATION CONTROL

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27240%2F18%3A10241662" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27240/18:10241662 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://homel.vsb.cz/~luk76/publications/IJRA18.pdf" target="_blank" >http://homel.vsb.cz/~luk76/publications/IJRA18.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2316/Journal.206.2018.4.206-5308" target="_blank" >10.2316/Journal.206.2018.4.206-5308</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO FORMATION CONTROL

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper considers the differential game approach to the leaderless formation control problem of a linear dynamical multi-robot system with directed graph topology. The formation requirement is formulated in terms of a finite-horizon quadratic cost function for each robot through the use of graph Laplacian and optimal control theory. The motion equations of robots and formation cost functions are the state equations and cost functions of the differential game. In the differential game approach, each robot can select its neighbours and implement distributed controllers; however, there is no guarantee that the formation control exists. The main contribution of this paper is a differential game formulation to formation control admitting a unique Nash equilibrium that ensures the existence of the formation control.

Název v anglickém jazyce

EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO FORMATION CONTROL

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper considers the differential game approach to the leaderless formation control problem of a linear dynamical multi-robot system with directed graph topology. The formation requirement is formulated in terms of a finite-horizon quadratic cost function for each robot through the use of graph Laplacian and optimal control theory. The motion equations of robots and formation cost functions are the state equations and cost functions of the differential game. In the differential game approach, each robot can select its neighbours and implement distributed controllers; however, there is no guarantee that the formation control exists. The main contribution of this paper is a differential game formulation to formation control admitting a unique Nash equilibrium that ensures the existence of the formation control.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10102 - Applied mathematics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International Journal of Robotics and Automation

ISSN

0826-8185

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

33

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

CA - Kanada

Počet stran výsledku

7

Strana od-do

428-434

Kód UT WoS článku

000440575600012

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—