Vice Epistemology of Believers in Pseudoscience

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F21%3A73608923" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/21:73608923 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/filozofia/?q=sk/filozofia.2021.76.10.1" target="_blank" >http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/filozofia/?q=sk/filozofia.2021.76.10.1</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.10.1" target="_blank" >10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.10.1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Vice Epistemology of Believers in Pseudoscience

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and a reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. Only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem, can we think of normative solutions to it.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Vice Epistemology of Believers in Pseudoscience

Popis výsledku anglicky

The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and a reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. Only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem, can we think of normative solutions to it.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-06678S" target="_blank" >GA20-06678S: Perspektivy paternalismu v demokratické společnosti: lekce z behaviorálních věd pro politickou filosofii</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

FILOZOFIA

ISSN

0046-385X

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

76

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

10

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

735-751

Kód UT WoS článku

000747758300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85123754793