Rationality, Autonomy, and Obedience to Linguistic Norms

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F21%3A50016959" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/21:50016959 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-020-02609-z" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-020-02609-z</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02609-z" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11229-020-02609-z</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Rationality, Autonomy, and Obedience to Linguistic Norms

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Many philosophers working today on the normativity of language have concluded that linguistic activity is not a matter of rule following. These conversations have been framed by a conception of linguistic normativity with roots in Wittgenstein and Kripke. In this paper I use conceptual resources developed by the classical American pragmatists and their descendants to argue that punctate linguistic acts are governed by rules in a sense that has been neglected in the recent literature on the normativity of language. In the course of arguing for this conclusion I defend a Kantian conception of rationality as rule-obeying activity, and I argue that this conception is compatible with a naturalistic understanding of ourselves as rational beings governed by rules of thought and action.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Rationality, Autonomy, and Obedience to Linguistic Norms

Popis výsledku anglicky

Many philosophers working today on the normativity of language have concluded that linguistic activity is not a matter of rule following. These conversations have been framed by a conception of linguistic normativity with roots in Wittgenstein and Kripke. In this paper I use conceptual resources developed by the classical American pragmatists and their descendants to argue that punctate linguistic acts are governed by rules in a sense that has been neglected in the recent literature on the normativity of language. In the course of arguing for this conclusion I defend a Kantian conception of rationality as rule-obeying activity, and I argue that this conception is compatible with a naturalistic understanding of ourselves as rational beings governed by rules of thought and action.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GF17-33808L" target="_blank" >GF17-33808L: Inferencializmus a kolektivní intencionalita</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Synthese

ISSN

0039-7857

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

198

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

9

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

8955-8980

Kód UT WoS článku

000560972200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85081568343